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ABSTRACT
This study argues that former West German Foreign Minister Hans- 
Dietrich Genscher's use of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe to promote pan-European unity formed a primary and consistent tenet of 
his foreign policy that he rarely subordinated for pragmatic reasons. The paper 
examines three case studies: the aftermath of the 1980-87 INF debate in West 
Germany, Genscher's initial reaction to Mikhail Gorbachev, and the reunification 
of Germany. The study examines the role the CSCE played in each of the 
aforementioned instances and compares Genscher's actions with his official 
rhetoric. The study then assesses the extent to which Genscher used the CSCE 
to foster his vision of a unified Europe and whether he consistently stuck to his 
goal. The examination suggests that Genscher used the CSCE to actively 
pursue pan-European unity without compromising German interests and his 
role as Foreign Minister of West Germany.
v
HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER AND THE CSCE PROCESS
Introduction
On May 17,1992 Hans-Dietrich Genscher retired from his position as 
Germany’s foreign minister. Genscher had held this post for eighteen years, a 
term of office that spanned both Christian Democratic and Social Democratic 
German governments and all of West Germany’s membership in the United 
Nations. Despite the length of Genscher’s term of office and the changing 
philosophies of the governing coalitions under which he served, Genscher’s 
foreign policy exhibited remarkable continuity. Appointed foreign minister on 
May 17, 1974, Genscher’s ascension to power coincided with the negotiation 
and conclusion of the Helsinki accords, a series of agreements designed to 
foster peaceful change in Europe through better relations between the two 
superpowers and their allies, and the creation of the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), a multilateral forum designed to help close 
the rift between eastern and western Europe. Both of these foreign policy 
experiences profoundly affected Genscher and his view of European unity.
From that point on, Genscher made the pursuit of pan-European unity one of 
his primary foreign policy objectives. Genscher defined his vision of pan- 
European unity as the bringing together of East and West Europe despite its 
post-war division by the superpowers.
To what extent was the use of the CSCE to foster a pan-Europeanism a 
main tenet of Genscher’s actual foreign policy? His critics have said that his 
principled evocation of a new Europe was somewhat lacking. His political 
generosity towards eastern Europe has been derided as appeasement.
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Genscher himself has often been described as a master tactician, a label that 
has haunted him throughout his career, and he was never able to throw off a 
reputation for “putting tactics before principles.”1 Genscher’s politics were at 
times described as “above all - some say at any cost - about compromise.” 
Helmut Schmidt, the former Chancellor of West Germany, whom Genscher 
helped depose by switching his small, centrist, Free Democratic Party’s 
allegiance to Helmut Kohl’s CDU-CSU, described him as a “tactician without a 
strategy.” Genscher has often been accused of paying lip service to his ideals 
while remaining secure in his policies by avoiding hard choices.2 This 
pragmatism is often seen as a reflection of the FDP’s effort to play “kingmaker” 
in the German party system, providing the CDU-CSU or the SPD with a 
coalition partner, yet winning votes by acting as a “corrective” to these larger 
parties.
Genscher’s supporters reject the accusation that his policies lacked 
principle. They point to the success his determination to keep open a dialogue 
with the east and the Soviet Union has engendered: a more democratic eastern 
Europe and the reunification of Germany.3 Which view is correct? Did 
Genscher the master tactician hold sway over Genscher the utopian? Did the 
foreign minister compromise his pan-European vision in order to achieve a 
consensus on his policies and avoid controversy?
This paper argues that foreign minister Genscher used the CSCE to 
foster his pan-European vision, and furthermore, this pan-European vision 
formed a primary and consistent tenet of his foreign policy that he rarely, if ever,
1 David Marsh, “A gap at the high table of power play,” The Financial Times, April 28,1992, 
P-2.
2 “Genscher’s last act,” The Economist, May 2,1992, p.58.
3 Ibid., p.58.
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subordinated for pragmatic reasons. The paper will proceed by examining three 
case studies: the aftermath of the 1980-87 INF debate in West Germany, 
Genscher’s initial reaction to Mikhail Gorbachev, and the reunification of 
Germany. The paper will examine the role the CSCE played in each of the 
cases and compare foreign minister Genscher’s actions with his official rhetoric. 
The paper will then assess the extent to which Genscher used the CSCE to 
foster his vision of a unified Europe and whether or not he consistently stuck to 
his goal.
CHAPTER I
Genscher's Pan-European Foreign Policy and the CSCE Process
Genscher has stated on dozens, possibly hundreds, of occasions the 
importance he attaches to bringing eastern and western Europe closer together. 
In a 1982 article published in Foreign Affairs, Genscher described the central 
elements of his foreign policy towards eastern Europe:
The central element of the...German policy toward the east, is the aim to 
establish and preserve a modus vivendi in a divided Europe-one which 
casts aside the basic conflict between East and West that cannot be 
resolved within the foreseeable future and which permits bridges of 
dialogue and cooperation to be spanned over the rifts formed by different 
philosophies and long-term goals. In this way it is intended, in the short 
term, to mitigate the effects of the division of Europe and, in the long term, 
to foster an evolutionary process in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union 
itself, leading to greater freedom for people in the East and to a genuine 
peace order in Europe.4
Genscher’s ultimate plan for Europe was its transformation into a 
cooperative entity with common goals, a concept he often referred to as a 
“common European house.” Genscher emphasized that his favorite vehicle for 
pursuing his pan-European vision was the CSCE. Consistently, throughout his 
term in office, Genscher stressed the importance of the CSCE as an absolutely 
necessary and effective device for achieving European unity:
4 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, “Toward an Overall Western Strategy for Peace, Freedom and 
Progress,” in Foreign Affairs Fall 1982, Vol.61, No.1, p.43-44.
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...the CSCE final act has given the West an important instrument for a 
dynamic policy of detente.... it gives us political legitimization for the 
realization of human rights, for peaceful change and for the gradual 
overcoming of the division of Europe.5
For Genscher, the CSCE was an instrument for reshaping Europe that 
provided a “dramatic, comprehensive forum which does not take the east-west 
confrontation for granted, but seeks to break it down.”6 Every nation 
participating in the CSCE process has an equal voice in its proceedings. 
Consequently, through its process of consensus building and constant 
deliberation, the CSCE appeared to provide Genscher with an ideal vehicle 
with which to pursue his vision of European unity.
The CSCE process has its roots in the Helsinki Final Act. The original 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe took place in Geneva from 
1973 to 1975. The document that ultimately arose out of this conference 
became known as the “Helsinki Accords.” Originally slated to take place only 
through 1973-75, the Geneva meetings gradually grew into a series of 
diplomatic roundtables which became known as the CSCE process. The 
process included, and continues to include, the U.S., Canada, and the countries 
of eastern and western Europe.
Immediately after its founding the CSCE became both an instrument of 
detente and a forum for East-West confrontation. It was dominated by 
conflicting objectives. The East, namely the Soviet Union, sought to use the 
CSCE to legitimize its presence in Europe, whereas the West attempted to use 
the conference to wrangle commitments on human rights, and freedom of
5 Ibid., p.57.
6 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, “Perspektiven einer europaischen Friedensordnung, Vienna, 
August 27, 1986, Bulletin 96 (Bundespresseamt, August 29, 1986), p.807-809.
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movement, people and ideas out of the East. The end result of two years of 
difficult and complex negotiations between East and West was the Helsinki 
Final Act. This document was not legally binding beyond the fact that the 
participating nations stated their determination to implement its provisions. The 
Final Act consisted of four sections or “baskets” which dealt with various fields of 
cooperation between the two blocs. The first basket contained a subsection 
entitled the Declaration on Principles. It was this section of the document which 
proved to be the most important in later years. The declaration included ten 
principles:
1. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty;
2. Refraining from the threat or use of force;
3. Inviolability of frontiers;
4. Territorial integrity of states;
5. Peaceful settlement of disputes;
6. Nonintervention in internal affairs;
7. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom 
of thought, conscience, religion, or belief;
8. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples;
9. Cooperation among states; and
10. Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law.7
Critics of the CSCE process saw it simply as an ersatz peace treaty for 
World War II. The Helsinki Agreement was derided as a non-binding document 
that served only to legitimize Soviet domination of eastern Europe. President 
Gerald Ford was criticized heavily in the United States for signing a document 
many considered to be without substance. John J. Moresca, a member of the 
U.S. delegation in Geneva and Helsinki, held the following point of view about 
the CSCE process:
7 Stefan Lehne, The CSCE in the 199Q’s: Common European House or Potemkin Village? 
(Wien: Braumueller, 1991), p.2.
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The signing of the Final Act...resolved very little in any specific sense; 
rather, it preserved more or less intact the various territorial and 
ideological disagreements, contradictions, and inconsistencies that have 
made up the postwar equilibrium in Europe.8
Despite such skepticism on the part of some participants and observers, 
the ten principles outlined in Basket I formed the basis for Genscher’s argument 
that the CSCE could be a dynamic tool to foster his pan-European vision. In 
particular, principles seven through ten formed the core of his plan for an active 
western detente policy.
It was intended that it [the declaration of principles] would contribute to 
increasing the personal liberty of the individual in the East, and to help 
make it possible for people on both sides of the border between East and 
West to come together again.9
The mere fact that the East was a signatory to these principles demonstrated to 
Genscher the East's belief that these topics should be an essential part of the 
East-West cooperative dialogue. This dialogue “gives us the political 
legitimization to call for...peaceful change and for the gradual overcoming of the 
division of Europe.”10 After Helsinki, Genscher contended that the discussion of 
peaceful change in the East was now a permanent part of East-West relations.
Genscher thus saw the CSCE as serving broader purposes than the 
realization of human rights in the East. The CSCE came to represent for 
Genscher a chance to institutionalize detente. It offered an important vehicle for 
keeping East-West detente intact while Genscher was forced to make difficult 
and unpopular (for the East) foreign and domestic policy decisions. The CSCE
8 John J. Moresca, To Helsinki The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 1973- 
1975 (Duke University Press: Durham, 1987), p.4.
9 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, “Toward an Overall Western Strategy for Peace, Freedom and 
Progress,” p.57.
10 Ibid., p.57.
could play an important role in Genscher’s diplomacy during the INF missile 
debate in West Germany (a potential disaster for East-West relations), 
Genscher’s initial overtures towards Mikhail Gorbachev (Genscher was the first 
to actively encourage trusting the Soviet General Secretary), and the process of 
German reunification (a potentially destabilizing occurrence for both East and
CHAPTER II 
The INF Debate
From its inception, the FRG’s approach to security policy had been one of 
reliance on American nuclear forces as a deterrent against possible Soviet 
aggression. Despite some initial protest, this unwavering dependence upon the 
American nuclear deterrent enjoyed widespread societal and governmental 
approval. However, after NATO’s 1967 Harmel Report reliance upon 
deterrence became increasingly coupled with the policy of detente towards the 
East.11 The inherent tension between a policy that emphasizes preparedness 
for devastating war (deterrence) and one that emphasizes arms control 
dialogue, increasing East-West openness and confidence-building activities 
(detente) did not tangibly come to the forefront of German politics until Helmut 
Schmidt’s Chancellorship (1974-1982). Reliance on the two track security 
policy (deterrence + detente = security) outlined in NATO’s 1967 Harmel Report 
began to unravel during the INF12 (Intermediate Nuclear Forces) debate that 
occurred during Schmidt’s Chancellorship.13
Helmut Schmidt began to create a more assertive role for the FRG in the
11 The Harmel Report was a strategy paper issued by the NATO organization in December of
1967. This report defined a long lasting NATO consensus: diplomacy and negotiations (detente) 
were a necessary complement to a policy of deterrence based on nuclear weapons.
12 INF forces are medium -range nuclear weapons based in Western Europe that are able to 
strike targets in the western parts of the Soviet Union. The INF debate centered around the 
deployment of 108 single-warhead Pershing II missiles in West Germany.
13 Thomas Risse-Kappen, The Zero Option INF. West Germany, and Arms Control (Westview 
Press: Boulder, 1988), p. 21.
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late 1970’s. Disenchanted with the tenor of American leadership and upset by 
what he perceived to be a U.S. lack of concern for West Germany's strategic 
position, Schmidt began to draw attention to the disparity between the INF 
forces of the Warsaw Pact and those of NATO. Schmidt suggested that decisive 
steps be taken to remedy the growing imbalance of forces. NATO’s response 
was the so called "double-track" decision of 1979. This decision presupposed
negotiation with the Soviet Union to persuade them to remove their SS-20
>
intermediate range nuclear missiles from Eastern Europe. Coupled with these 
actions was the threat that if the Soviet negotiations failed, NATO would deploy 
similar intermediate range missiles in Western Europe (most notably West 
Germany).14
By pursuing these nuclear weapons initiatives Helmut Schmidt had given 
primacy to two central goals of West German security policy: fostering and 
maintaining a credible deterrent based on an alliance with the West and the 
prevention of American “decoupling.” During Helmut Schmidt’s tenure, these 
goals appeared to take precedence over the pursuit of detente. Schmidt’s 
prominent leadership role did not give Genscher much room for maneuver with 
his detente policies, certainly not on the scale he began to enjoy from 1983 
onwards.15 However, Genscher and Schmidt were both proponents of the 
stationing of NATO missiles on German soil.
The initial NATO twin track INF proposal was met with silence by the 
Soviet Union. The primary stumbling block to the early negotiations had been 
NATO insistence on the “zero option": the notion of forgoing deployment of 
Pershing II and cruise missiles altogether in return for acceptable Soviet
14 Michael R. Lucas, The Western Alliance after INF. Redefining U.S. Policy toward Europe 
and the Soviet Union (Lynne Rienner: Boulder, 1990), p.11.
15 Emil J. Kirchner, “Genscher and What Lies Behind Genscherism,” West European Politics, 
Volume 13, April 1990 #2, p. 163.
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concessions. The zero option had been debated both within Germany and 
NATO and differing zero options had been proposed. Chancellor Schmidt 
favored a European zero option, i.e., the West would agree not to deploy any 
INF missiles provided the Soviet Union withdrew all of its SS-20 missiles that 
were within striking distance of Western Europe.16
Genscher’s FDP had also committed itself to a zero option at its party 
conference in Freiburg in June 1980. The party program stated:
The FDP will do everything in its power to ensure that the negotiation 
offer made to the Warsaw Pact and coupled to NATO’s modernization 
decision receives vigorous support. Our aim must be total renunciation 
of the production and basing of medium-range nuclear weapons on both 
sides.17
Unlike Schmidt, the FDP favored a global zero option: the total elimination of 
Soviet INFs in return for Western non-deployment. The global zero option was 
supported strongly by Genscher and later became the U.S. and NATO’s 
negotiating position in the INF talks.
By presenting a global zero option proposal that many westerners felt 
was essentially unacceptable to the Soviets, NATO was able to balance its 
avowed goals of deterrence and arms control.18 However, the zero option 
proposal also served to highlight the tension inherent in the FRG’s appeal for 
nuclear arms on German soil to strengthen deterrence, and its simultaneous 
appeal for arms control to make deterrence more palatable to the German 
public.19
16 Thomas Risse-Kappen, p.80.
17 Wahlprogram der Freien Demokratischen Partei fur die Bundesfagswahlen am 5 .10.1980, 
Freiburg, June 7, 1980, p. 12.
18 Michael R. Lucas, p. 10.
19 Clay Clemens, “Beyond INF.West Germany’s centre-right party and arms control in the 
1990’s.” International Affairs. Vol. 65, No.1 (Winter 1988-89),p.59.
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In early Winter 1983, after much debate within the German Bundestag, 
the Pershing II missiles were installed in West Germany. The Soviet reaction to 
their deployment was frigid. The day after the German Bundestag passed the 
resolution supporting deployment, Soviet diplomats walked out of INF 
negotiations in Geneva. Soviet pronouncements aimed at the Kohl-Genscher 
government were very hostile. Moscow described Bonn’s leaders in caustic 
terms as German revanchists. Soviet relations with West Germany and the 
West entered a second “ice age” with the USSR attempting to isolate the 
Federal Republic internationally.
Yet with Mikhail Gorbachev’s rise to power and subsequent foreign 
policy “peace offensive” towards the West, the zero option, much to the dismay 
of the CDU-CSU leaders, gained credibility as a realistic arms control option. 
Gorbachev broke the impasse that existed under the Brezhnev regime with his 
January 15, 1986 proposal to free the world of nuclear weapons by the year 
2000. The details of this proposal came very close to the Western zero option. 
Gorbachev offered to trade away all the SS-20 missiles based in Europe for the 
removal of the Pershing II and cruise missiles. For the first time a Soviet leader 
had proposed a nuclear balance in Europe that meant parity between the U.S. 
and the Soviet Union, not a balance seen as unfairly weighted towards the 
USSR.20
The Reykjavik summit meeting between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail 
Gorbachev represented a breakthrough for INF. While the summit meeting 
brought no concrete achievements, both Reagan and Gorbachev had 
negotiated far beyond their previous stances. In particular, Ronald Reagan had 
gone far beyond what had been previously agreed upon by NATO alliance
20 Thomas Risse-Kappen, p. 110.
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members.21
The new developments caused a general sense of panic within the CDU- 
CSU. The potential elimination of nuclear weapons from the theater of Europe 
threatened the CDU-CSU’s long standing position on the need for long-range 
nuclear missiles to strengthen the coupling of Europe’s defense to the U.S.. As 
the broad outlines of the INF treaty became more apparent, so did the fears of 
the conservative CDU-CSU members. Franz-Josef Strauss of the CSU 
criticized the impending double-zero proposal by saying it would “naturally 
mean a decoupling of America from Europe.”22 Strauss’s stance epitomized the 
fears of many of the governing coalition’s members.
Genscher's Role
In 1980 Genscher supported NATO’s twin-track INF policy. Members of 
Genscher’s political party, the FDP, challenged his security policies a number of 
times in the early 1980’s. During the FDP’s 1981 party congress in Cologne 
there was considerable resistance to Genscher’s support for the twin-track 
decision and he was forced to threaten to resign if the party refused to support 
him on INF.23 At the same time many FDP members found their coalition 
partner, the SPD, to be drifting towards a position of anti-American, anti-NATO 
neutralism. The neutralist tendencies of the SPD were even more unpalatable 
to many FDP members than Genscher’s support for the twin-track decision. On 
August 21,1981, Genscher spoke before the Free Democrats of the West 
German state of Hessen. During that speech Genscher laid out his rationale for 
supporting the deployment of INF. Genscher’s rationale struck the chords of
21 lbid.,p.116.
22 As quoted in the Washington Post, June 2,1987, p.1.
23 Thomas Risse-Kappen, p.76
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arms control, cooperation in the European Community, and the special German 
responsibility for peace in Europe.24 In his speech, Genscher stressed the 
importance of German support for NATO’s double-track decision. Genscher 
stated that German support, or lack of support, for NATO's double-track decision 
would indicate to the world whether Germany was allied with the West or was 
drifting towards a dangerous neutralism. He stated:
We will not forget, who our friend and ally is, and who is not our friend 
and ally. We do not stand equally distant from the USA and the Soviet 
Union. Like the USA, we are a part of the West. One must say to those 
whose talk arouses another impression: American troops are in West 
Germany in order that free trade unions exist and Soviet troops are in 
Poland to see to it that free trade unions there do not exist. That is the 
difference.25
The debate over the INF issue began to undermine the FDP’s 
partnership with the SPD severely in 1981. The FDP-SPD governing coalition 
fell apart in 1982 when Genscher orchestrated the FDP’s switch to the CDU- 
CSU. Genscher felt that this switch was necessary in order to guarantee 
continuity in his foreign policy.26 While in power with the SPD, Genscher had 
portrayed his party as a curb on the neutralist excesses of the Social 
Democrats. After the switch in October of 1982 to a Christian-Liberal coalition, 
Genscher and his party portrayed themselves as the liberal check on the 
encroachment of the right-wing of the CDU-CSU. Ironically, it was during the 
FDP’s partnership with the more conservative CDU-CSU coalition that the 
detente aspect of the dual track policy became more prominent. While in power 
with the CDU-CSU Genscher began to voice his concerns over the long-term
24 Jeffrey Herf, p. 158.
25 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, “Unsere Kinder und Enkelen die Schrecken des Krieges 
ersparen,” Frankfurter Rundschau, September 8, 1982, p. 14.
26 Jeffrey Herf, p. 159.
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viability of nuclear deterrence and strongly stated his desire to replace 
deterrence with arms control and confidence building measures.
Throughout the INF debate Genscher continued the FRG’s participation 
in the CSCE process despite the fact that between 1983 and 1986 the Soviet 
Union sought to punish West Germany by isolating it internationally and 
bypassing it in developing relations with the rest of Western Europe27 .
Genscher emphasized the role of the CSCE in an attempt to keep East-West 
detente from collapsing during this difficult period.
This year, as in the past, the federal government has demonstrated its 
interest in developing relations between East and West in Europe by 
holding regular contacts with all its neighbors in the East. We realize that 
special importance attaches to our relations with the Soviet Union...The 
political dialogue...needs to be further strengthened, particularly where 
differences of opinion exist...both sides know that German-Soviet 
relations must not be allowed to stagnate if developments between East 
and West Europe are to proceed favorably 28
As an outgrowth of the CSCE process, the Conference on Confidence- 
and-Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) held in 
Stockholm, Sweden provided Genscher with an opportunity to pursue his new 
detente thrust. The CDE grew out of a French proposal for a disarmament 
conference at the 1984 CSCE meeting in Madrid. As superpower relations 
deteriorated in the mid-1980’s, the prospect of a CDE conference became 
increasingly desirable for both the West Europeans and the Soviets. Increased 
Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles, coupled with NATO’s double-track 
response of further deploying INF while simultaneously attempting to engage in
27 Horst Teltschik, “Gorbachev’s Reform Policy and the Outlook for East-West Relations,” 
AussenpoiWk, Vol.40, No.3, 1989, p.208.
28 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, “German Soviet Relations in East-West Perspective,” Article 
published in Suddeutsche Zeitung, July 2, 1986, Statements and Speeches, July 10,1986, p.3- 
4.
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arms negotiations to eliminate them, created an increasingly tenuous situation.
The Soviets welcomed the CDE conference as a chance to further 
denounce NATO deployment of INF. Many NATO members, including West 
Germany, were panic-stricken at the thought of a Soviet walkout from current 
arms control talks. Consequently, West European NATO members desperately 
wanted a forum to show that East-West detente could continue in spite of 
NATO’s deployment of INF forces.
The end result of the CDE conference was a set of five confidence-and 
security-building measures intended to lessen the chance of military 
confrontation in Europe resulting from misperception or miscalculation; to bring 
more openness to European military activities; and inhibit surprise attack and 
the use of force for threat or intimidation. Among these measures were: 
requirements that all CDE signatories be notified in advance of certain military 
activities conducted in Europe; to exchange annual schedules of military 
activities; to invite observers from all participating states to certain military 
activities; and provisions for verification of compliance, including an 
unprecedented measure for on-site inspection on demand.29
At the CDE conference Genscher illustrated his renewed detente 
offensive:
The confidence and security building measures which are the subject of 
our negotiations here in Stockholm should not merely be the preliminary 
stage of disarmament measures...They should also lay the foundations 
for cooperative security arrangements which remove the incentive for the
use of force as well as the fear of such force The aim is to strengthen
confidence and security by means of a set of politically binding, militarily 
significant and verifiable measures which will have to be applied 
throughout Europe. All involved have become increasingly aware that 
confidence building is an indispensable element of a policy aimed at 
detente and cooperation. Only on the basis of growing confidence
29 Carl C. Krehbiel. Confidence-and Security-Building Measures in Europe The Stockholm 
Conference (Praeger: New York, 1989), p.1.
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founded on concrete measures will it be possible to make progress in 
mutual cooperation and toward an accommodation in the field of security 
among the participating states. Our aim is to effectively and visibly 
reduce the danger of the use of military power by means of cooperative 
confidence-building measures.30
When the INF debate was raging in West Germany in 1987 Genscher 
again made his stance on the issue quite clear. In direct opposition to the 
conservative members of the governing coalition Genscher repeatedly 
announced his unqualified support for the proposals. Genscher’s FDP applied 
pressure on the CDU-CSU by tacitly linking the governing coalition’s survival to 
greater CDU flexibility on the INF issue.31 The position of the federal 
government soon became untenable. Isolated by its allies and by public 
opinion, as well as by its coalition partner, the FDP, the CDU-CSU indicated its 
agreement with the INF proposals. Genscher and the FDP had prevailed over 
its larger coalition partner. Genscher welcomed the early 1988 INF agreement 
as a “Soviet-American contribution to detente and as the late fruits of the twin- 
track policy which had been intended to secure the removal of the SS-20s from 
Eastern Europe.”32
Genscher’s Foreign Policy
The INF issue demonstrated the increasing inseparability of arms control 
and eastern diplomacy.33 Genscher illustrated this point in a September 2,
30 Hans-Dietrich Genscher,” Speech at the CSCE Conference on Confidence and Security 
Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe,” Stockholm, January 28,1986. As quoted in 
Vojtech Mastny, The Helsinki Process and the Reintegration of Europe 1986-1991. (New York 
University Press:New York, 1992), p.71-72.
31 Clay Clemens, “West Germany’s centre-right and arms control,” p.60.
32 William E. Paterson, “Foreign and Security Policy,” in Gordon Smith, William E. Paterson, 
Peter H. Merkl, Editors, Developments in West German Politics (Duke University Press:Durham, 
1989), p. 197
33 lbid.,p.61.
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1987 speech to the German Bundestag.
European peace policy in this nuclear age necessitates comprehensive 
cooperation between East and West. It requires peaceful reconciliation 
of interests as the outcome of an intensive, continuous dialogue. 
Comparing military arsenals with each other leads us along the wrong 
path, that of an arms race, if there is no comprehensive political and 
security concept pointing the way from confrontation to cooperation.34
Genscher’s concept of a future cooperative security net was a broad one 
grounded in his pan-European vision. It encompassed economic, political, 
psychological and cultural aspects while purposefully attempting to downgrade 
the necessity of a military component.
As a result of increasing cooperation, of genuine detente and of 
disarmament, the military elements will lose significance in the West-East 
relationship, whereas others-political, economic, cultural cooperation- 
wili gain in importance.35
The threat of force, he argued, should eventually be replaced with 
cooperation, trust, interdependence, confidence-building measures and other 
aspects of cooperative security. The use of force to intimidate or threaten, and 
the striving for military superiority, foster mutual insecurity, not cooperative 
security. The primary vehicle for building this cooperation and interdependence 
between East and West was to be the CSCE. Genscher saw the INF Treaty as 
a vital step to a CSCE-based process of overcoming the East-West division:
Progress in nuclear disarmament makes the establishment of 
conventional stability in Europe all the more important. We seek to 
establish this stability at a low level of weapons by means of 
disarmament. No state should be capable of attacking; each should be
34 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, “Elimination of intermediate Nuclear forces,” Speech made before 
the German Bundestag in Bonn, September 2, 1987, Statements and Speeches, p.2.
35 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, “The German Responsibility for Peace in Europe,” speech at the 
School for Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University Bologna Center, 
Bologna, Italy, October 3,1988, Statements and Speeches, October 4,1988, p.3.
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able only to defend. The strategy proposed by the West for this purpose 
will strengthen security in every single part of Europe... It is time to draw 
up the blueprint for a peaceful order in Europe. That requires more than 
just disarmament. To prevent any kind of war in Europe forever and to 
secure lasting peace, to gain more stability through political dialogue and 
cooperation in all fields, to bring people closer together again in divided 
Europe, and hence in divided Germany, too, by means of unhindered 
contacts and free exchanges of opinion and information, to implement 
human rights - these aims are the core of the political philosophy 
underlying the Helsinki Final Act.36
Genscher pushed for both the INF Treaty and CSCE as parts of a cooperative 
security structure that would incorporate all of Europe.
Genscher’s foreign policy often consisted of balancing several 
overlapping and inconsistent policies. The NATO double-track decision 
presented such a situation. Initially, Genscher was forced to sacrifice detente 
for defense policy. The necessity of preserving the Western alliance took 
precedence over the pursuit of detente. However, even in the face of 
deteriorating superpower relations and a poor international climate, Genscher 
did not forsake the CSCE process. Coupled with the CDE process, Genscher 
used the CSCE to fill the gap in East-West dialogue created by the INF debate. 
The CSCE process was not simply a token effort during this period. It produced 
the CDE agreement on confidence and security building measures which 
sought to lessen the chances for military mishaps between East and West. 
While Genscher was forced to downplay the detente track of his foreign policy, 
he nevertheless was able to pursue his vision of pan-European cooperation 
through the CSCE process.
Genscher’s vision of a pan-European cooperative security arrangement 
began to take definitive shape with the 1985 ascension to power of Mikhail
36 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, “Towards a Strategy for Progress,” speech at the meeting of the 
Institute for East-West Security Studies, St. Paul Minnesota, October 10,1987, Statements and 
Speeches, October 10, 1987, p.6.
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Gorbachev in the Soviet Union. Genscher saw quite early on that Gorbachev’s 
“new thinking” offered the prospect of fulfilling his concept of cooperative 
security and that this in turn might allow for the division of Europe to be 
overcome peacefully.
CHAPTER III 
Genscher and Gorbachev
With the ascension of Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary of the 
Soviet Union, Genscher found the perfect partner with whom to bring his pan- 
European vision to fruition. However, the new General Secretary was not a 
willing partner from the start of his tenure in office. Gorbachev needed to 
consolidate his power at home before projecting radical change abroad. 
Gorbachev did not assume office feeling strong domestic pressure to alter the 
USSR’s international situation. He tended to stress domestic improvement to 
achieve foreign policy success, not the opposite, and initially he continued the 
same foreign policies as his predecessor Leonid Brezhnev.37
During his first year in office Gorbachev thus also continued Brezhnev’s 
policy of isolating the Federal Republic in international relations. However, as 
early as the spring of 1985 Gorbachev began calling for renewed momentum in 
detente. In a speech marking the fortieth anniversary of the Soviet victory over 
Germany, Gorbachev stated:
We believe that the process of detente should be revived. This does not 
mean, however, a simple return to what was achieved in the 1970’s. It is 
necessary to strive for something much greater. From our point of view, 
detente is not an end goal of politics. It is needed, but only as a 
transitional stage from a world cluttered with arms to a reliable and
37 John Van Oudenaren, Detente in Europe: The Soviet Union and the West since 1953 
(Duke University Press:Durham, 1991), p.354.
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comprehensive system of international security.38
Throughout the period of cool West German-Soviet relations, Genscher 
had attempted to ease the relationship through endless diplomatic visits to the 
Soviet Union in addition to repeated calls for renewed detente. Genscher’s 
attempts at reconciliation with the Soviets were met with skepticism by both 
German and NATO leaders. Genscher’s famous call for Western leaders to 
“take Gorbachev at his word” was almost universally seen as premature and 
misguided. However, subsequent events were to prove Genscher’s gesture 
prescient. The late 1980’s saw the Soviet Union begin to place a high priority 
on improving West German-Soviet relations. The conclusion of the INF 
agreement and the re-establishment of cordial relations between the 
superpowers removed the final obstacles for renewed good relations between 
the FRG and the Soviet Union.
Genscher’s Foreign Policy
A major contributing factor to the improvement in relations was 
Genscher’s attempt to define a new Western policy towards Gorbachev and the 
USSR. Following the reelection of the CDU-CSU-FDP coalition and 
Gorbachev’s performance at the January 1987 Central Committee plenum in 
Moscow, Genscher distinguished himself as one of the first western diplomats to 
advocate “taking Gorbachev at his word” and test the Soviet leader’s 
willingness to pursue new East-West agreements.39 Genscher outlined this 
new policy on February 1, 1987 in his oft-quoted speech in Davos, Switzerland.
38 Pravda, May 9,1985
39 Ronald D. Asmus, “Bonn’s Ostpolitik in the Age of Gorbachev,” in James A. Cooney, 
Wolfgang-Uwe Friedrich, and Gerald R. Kleinfeld’s German-American Relations Yearbook 1 
(Campus Verlag: Frankfurt, 1989, p.83.
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In Davos, Genscher described his policy prescription for western 
relations with Gorbachev. He argued that Gorbachev’s “new thinking” 
represented a recognition that the policies of military buildup pursued by 
Brezhnev had only resulted in a ruinous arms race. The end results of these 
policies had been the rearming of the West and the neglect of the Soviet 
economy. As a consequence of these actions the Soviets were making no 
headway in the development of modern technologies. The Soviets were “in 
danger of remaining bogged down in the industrial age as the world around 
advances into the information age.” In order to modernize the economy, 
Gorbachev needed to promote peaceful external relations to end the arms race, 
and open up Soviet society to the world.40
In the Davos speech, Genscher offered some proof of his assertions 
concerning the new Soviet General Secretary. In the area of arms control, he 
noted that the Soviet leader had stated that he was ready to accept drastic cuts 
in strategic nuclear systems and a zero option for INF forces in Europe.
Genscher further noted that at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and 
Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe that Gorbachev had 
“broken with the principle, hitherto sacrosanct to the Soviet Union, that on-site 
inspections for the purpose of verifying compliance with arms-control 
agreements would not be tolerated.”
In addition, Genscher pointed out the shift in ideological tone of the 
Gorbachev regime, a shift that he took pains to point out “is consistent with 
responsible Western policies:”
Whereas Mr. Brezhnev still maintained that the correlation of forces in the 
world was constantly shifting in favor of Moscow, Mr. Gorbachev has
40 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, “Taking Gorbachev at his Word,” speech at the World Economic 
Forum, Davos, Switzerland, February 1,1987, Statements and Speeches, February 6,1987.
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made no link between the concept of peaceful coexistence of states on 
the one hand and the class struggle and ideological challenge to the 
West on the other. Mr. Gorbachev has shifted the emphasis onto new 
subjects. He refers time and time again to the interdependence of 
nations, he speaks of environmental problems and other global issues 
which make the world dependent upon cooperation for survival.41
Gorbachev’s “new thinking” offered Genscher the prospect of a radically 
new concept of security in Europe, a cooperative structure that meant that the 
division of Europe might finally be overcome peacefully. Genscher quoted 
Gorbachev with approval on the question of international security in the Davos 
speech:
The nature of modern weapons is such that no single country can hope 
to protect itself by means of military technology, by building up a 
defensive shield, no matter how powerful. The task of maintaining 
security assumes more and more a political character. Hence it can only 
be accomplished by political means....With regard to relations between 
the Soviet Union and the United States, security can only be a mutual 
state, and with regard to international relations as a whole, it can only be 
of a general nature. The ultimate wisdom lies not in thinking solely of 
oneself, and worse still to the detriment of the other side. All must feel 
they have the same degree of security 42
Throughout the speech Genscher argued for a new, more flexible 
Western approach to the Soviet Union that sought to evaluate Gorbachev 
without prejudice.
If there should be a chance today that, after 40 years of East-West 
confrontation, there could be a turning point in East-West relations, it 
would be a mistake of historic dimensions for the West to let this chance 
slip just because it cannot escape from a way of thinking which invariably 
expects the worst from the Soviet Union.43
41 ibid., p.3.
42 Mikhail Gorbachev, as quoted in Hans-Dietrich Genscher, “Taking Gorbachev at his Word,”
43 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Taking Gorbachev at his Word,” p.5.
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Genscher went on to provide the broad outlines of a Western policy that 
would take Gorbachev and his “new policy” seriously. This approach consisted 
of three tracks which would seek to “influence, expedite and shape” 
developments in the Soviet Union. The first policy initiative entailed setting up 
cooperative security structures in order to provide equal security for all countries 
of Europe and the world. Part and parcel of the creation of these structures 
would be the initiation of a comprehensive process of disarmament.
The second track consisted of economic cooperation with the East to assist the 
Soviet Union in the process of modernizing its economy. The third track 
consisted of tf\e West embracing the concept of “a common European edifice” 
and working with the Soviets to make all of Europe a “common home” whose 
inhabitants coexist peacefully and where “the division between East and West 
is increasingly overcome and where human rights are respected.”44
A major theme in the Davos speech is the role Genscher accorded the 
CSCE in Western dealings with the Soviet Union. After outlining his 
recommendations for a three-tiered Western approach to the Soviet Union he 
had this to say about the CSCE:
Disarmament aimed at stability, economic cooperation and improvement 
of the human rights situation - these are the three main aspects of the 
CSCE process. All these aspects are inseparably linked. Progress in 
one area encourages progress in the others. A stalemate in one blocks 
progress in the others, too. In full awareness of this link, the participating 
states covered all three aspects in the Helsinki Final Act. It has thus 
become a guide outlining the course towards a peaceful order in Europe, 
in which nations with differing social and political systems can develop in 
peaceful competition without fear of each other45
Genscher had become convinced that Gorbachev's foreign policy
44 ibid., p.5.
45 lbjd.,p.7.
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represented a fundamental shift in Soviet strategy and that Gorbachev’s 
description of a “common European house” corresponded with his desire to 
create a new European cooperative security structure.
Genscher’s Role
A few weeks after the Davos speech Genscher took the lead in sternly 
reprimanding the U.S. for its apparent attempt to circumvent the 1972 U.S.- 
Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM). The U.S. was perceived as 
attempting to loosen the scope of the treaty in order to test elements of the 
controversial Strategic Defense Initiative. In a discussion with the U.S.
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Richard N. Perle, Genscher stated that without 
prior negotiations with the Soviets, Washington should not unilaterally broaden 
its interpretation of the ABM treaty.46 After the meeting, Genscher asserted that 
the tone of his discussion with Perle “underscored the need to submit to careful 
examination among the alliance partners the consequences of any possible 
unilateral decision for...East-West relations as a whole.”47
During the INF debate in West Germany, Genscher risked an open 
confrontation with Chancellor Helmut Kohl by publicly arguing the merits of 
Gorbachev’s proposals for the abolition of both medium and short range missile 
in Europe 48 More conservative members of the governing FDP-CDU-CSU 
coalition were very reluctant to remove all short range missiles from Germany 
for reasons of deterrence. By virtue of his public proclamations, Genscher 
succeeded in forcing the hand of his coalition partners into adopting his pro-
46 William Tuohy, “U.S. Should Strictly Abide by ABM Treaty Terms, Bonn Says,” Los Angeles 
Times, February 27,1987, Part 1, p8.
47 Ibid., p.8.
48 James M. Markham, “Bonn Centrist Party Gains on Arms Issue,” The New York Times, May 
18, 1987, p.A3.
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Gorbachev stance.
In January of the following year Genscher undertook a four day visit to 
Poland to underscore the “new dynamism” of Bonn’s relations with the 
Communist nations of Eastern Europe.49 After meeting with Polish leader 
General Wojciech Jaruzelski, Genscher said that the two governments had 
agreed to set up working groups that would undertake to resolve differences on 
security questions, financial and economic issues, and proposed treaties on 
scientific, cultural and consular affairs. Genscher told reporters after his 
meeting with General Jaruzelski that “never have conditions [for East-West 
relations] been so favorable as they are today.”50
In June of 1988, during a U.S.-Soviet summit in Moscow, Gorbachev 
presented Ronald Reagan with the outlines of a plan for sharp reductions in 
conventional forces in Europe. U.S. officials curtly rebuffed the plan as 
“propaganda that did not deserve serious consideration.”51 In contrast to the 
U.S. response, Genscher warmly welcomed the Soviet proposal. Genscher 
stated that the proposal was “very important” and that it would serve as “a good 
foundation” for further discussions between the two blocs on reducing 
nonnuclear forces 52 He further asserted that “Western policy must now 
recognize and use the historic opportunity inherent in the Soviet Union’s new 
thinking. This calls for self-confidence and the ability to recognize and use new 
developments.”53 Genscher’s statements, which were made at a conference
49 William Tuohy, “Genscher Ends Poland Trip, Hails Gains,” Los Angeles Times, January 14, 
1988, Section 1, p.7.
50 Ibid., p.7.
51 Jim Hoagland, “Senior West German Backs Soviet Troop-Cut Plan,” The Washington Post, 
June 12, 1988, p.A1.
52 Ibid., p.A29.
53 Ibid., p.A29.
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sponsored by the Institute for East-West studies, were seen by conference 
participants as a “clear bid to expand his influence in managing the relationship 
between...Eastern and Western Europe.”54 In fact, by making these statements 
Genscher became the first Western leader to welcome the Soviet plan.
In October of 1988, Helmut Kohl met with Gorbachev in Moscow. The 
meeting represented a major step for Genscher “in his efforts to carve the 
special role he claims for West Germany in bridging the division of Europe.”55 
In an article published in Die Zeit on the night of Chancellor Kohl’s departure, 
Genscher stated “It is the awareness of our historical duty that prompts us 
Germans to acknowledge a special responsibility for confidence building 
between West and East. We shall not evade this responsibility, and nobody can 
relieve us of it.”56 The main thrust of the Die Zeit article was that Gorbachev 
represented the best hope to date for a reunited Europe. Genscher described 
Gorbachev’s reforms as “impressively dynamic” and further argued that the 
West should make a special effort to help the Soviet leader: “The more the 
Soviet reforms advance, the more the Soviet Union will be able to cooperate 
with Western democracies in every respect.”57
Genscher’s pro-Gorbachev stance attracted quite a bit of criticism from 
NATO allies and, in particular, the U.S. The term “Genscherism” was coined 
initially in response to Genscher’s enthusiasm for Gorbachev’s arms proposal, 
but it came to stand for an uncritical enthusiasm for the Soviet leader and a 
willingness to help him. Genscher’s initial overtures to Gorbachev and the East
54 Ibid., p.A29.
55 Serge Schmemann, “Visit Bolsters West German’s Gorbachev Ties,” The New York Times, 
October 30, 1988, p.8.
56 Ibid., p.8.
57 Ibid., p.8.
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met with mixed reactions from Western diplomats. West Germany’s attempts to 
strengthen Soviet and Eastern Bloc relations were seen as economically and 
pragmatically motivated. Following Genscher’s visit to Poland in early 1988 
Western officials expressed ambivalence about his intentions. One diplomat 
noted “The West Germans have a pragmatic foreign policy, they see that there 
is much to be gained by strengthening their relations with the Eastern European 
countries.”58
As Genscher’s overtures toward Gorbachev became more concrete, 
criticism of his actions grew on several levels. The most common criticism was 
that he attempted to “be all things to all people” and therefore could not be 
trusted. Jim Hoagland, a journalist for The Washington Post, argued that the 
most pressing question facing NATO was not whether to trust Gorbachev, “but 
whether to trust the politically ambidextrous Genscher.”59 Critics within NATO 
began to fear that Genscher, because of his foreign policy successes with the 
Soviets, might be in effect a mole for the Soviets. European members of NATO 
projected their fears about Germany in general onto Genscher’s actions. Talk 
about Genscher’s “unreliability” within NATO circles soon led to a fear of a 
German deal with the Soviets that would result in the reuniting of Germany as 
Europe’s new great power.60 Helmut Kohl’s Moscow meeting with Gorbachev 
was watched closely by West Germany’s allies. One diplomatic observer noted 
that “The allies are always a little worried that Germans might stray off the 
reservation. They know that German reunification is ultimately in the hands of 
Moscow.”61
58 William Tuohy, “Genscher Ends Poland Trip, Hails Gains,”p.7.
59 Jim Hoagland, “Rhetoric From Bonn,” The Washington Post, August 18, 1988, p.A23.
60 Ibid., p.A23.
61 William Tuohy, “Hopes High For Accords During Kohl’s Trip To Moscow”, Los Angeles 
Times, October 22, 1988, part 1,p.5.
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In response to these growing criticisms Genscher sought to allay any 
fears that Germany had ulterior political motives in its relationship with the 
Soviet Union. In October of 1988 Genscher stated:
Progress in bilateral relations will not only be to the benefit of further 
* improvement of cooperation all over Europe but also to the benefit of 
East-West Relations. The far-reaching projects to restructure and 
modernize the Soviet economy offer many opportunities for West 
Germany as the most important Soviet trade partner.62
The onslaught of criticism leveled at Genscher was swept aside in the 
wake of Gorbachev’s late 1988 announcement to the United Nations that the 
Soviet Union would unilaterally reduce troops in Eastern Europe, some six 
divisions and 5,000 tanks. After the speech, Genscher declared his early 
acceptance of the Soviet leader justified: “I personally feel vindicated in my 
long-held view that the Soviet General Secretary is serious about a far-reaching 
change in East-West relations through cooperation and disarmament.”63 
Genscher sought to link Gorbachev’s pledge to reduce conventional 
forces to the ongoing CSCE meeting in Vienna. The CSCE had been meeting 
in Vienna for two years in order to set an agenda for the 1989 “conventional 
stability” negotiations.64 Genscher praised Gorbachev’s initiative as a “new 
chapter in the history of disarmament” that would give “new impetus” to the 
Vienna talks.65 In a deliberate attempt to force NATO’s allies to adopt his line of
62 ibid., p.5.
63 Serge Schmemann, “Bonn Enthusiastic About Soviet Cuts,” The New York Times, 
December 11, 1988, p. 15.
64 The negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) began on March 6,
1989. They were designed to negotiate a level of parity in the conventional forces of NATO and 
the Warsaw Pact as a compliment to the reduction in nuclear forces agreed to under the INF treaty. 
The goal was to achieve “conventional stability” between the two blocs once the counterweight of 
nuclear deterrence was removed from the balance-of-power equation.
65 Ibid., p.5.
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thinking Genscher publicly pronounced that “progress [in Vienna] will depend 
on a courageous use of the opportunities and on discarding the 
faintheartedness that normally prevails among many Western observers.”66 
Through his statements and actions Genscher had largely succeeded in setting 
the tone of the West's relations with the East.
Genscher’s Davos speech and subsequent actions were followed by 
dramatic improvements in East-West relations. The signing of the INF Treaty in 
late 1987, Gorbachev’s consolidation of power at the Nineteenth CPSU party 
conference in July 1988, the Soviet pledge to reduce conventional forces in 
Eastern Europe, and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan all served to 
bolster Genscher’s conviction that Gorbachev was responsible for a 
fundamental reorientation of Soviet policy that was unlikely to be reversed.67 
Genscher had become increasingly convinced that Gorbachev’s evocation of a 
“common European house” corresponded with his desire to create a new 
European cooperative security structure.
Genscher’s enthusiastic support for Gorbachev demonstrated his belief 
that Gorbachev represented the prospect of a dramatic enhancement of ties 
between the divided halves of Europe. The accelerating pace of reform in 
Eastern Europe and the rise to power of non-communist governments further 
justified Genscher's approach and offered definitive proof that Gorbachev was 
serious in his support for self-determination in Europe. The eventual spillover of 
these events into the German Democratic Republic in 1989 and 1990 made 
German unification a possibility for the first time in over forty years.
66 ibid., p.5.
67 Ronald D. Asmus, “Bonn’s Ostpofitik in the Age of Gorbachev,”p.84.
CHAPTER IV
German Reunification
For over forty years the reunification of Germany was perceived only as a 
distant possibility. So distant, in fact, that the opposition party in the German 
Bundestag, the Social Democrats, ceased even to speak of reunification as a 
rhetorical goal of German foreign policy during the 1980’s.68 In less than twelve 
months German reunification was transformed from a distant concept to a 
concrete reality.
The German Democratic Republic (GDR) was long considered the most 
economically and politically stable of the communist bloc countries; therefore, 
the rapid disintegration of the hard-line communist government took the West by 
surprise. The crumbling of the communist regime in the GDR occurred because 
of several interlocking factors. Above all, massive street demonstrations and 
mass emigration to the West brought the collapse of Erich Honecker’s hard-line 
government in October of 1989.
Several events preceded this crisis. In August of 1989, encouraged by 
Gorbachev’s policies of perestroika and glasnost, the reformist faction of the 
Hungarian Communist Party dismantled its border fences with Austria. East 
Germans vacationing in Hungary used the border opening to flee to West 
Germany. By the end of September 1989 approximately 30,000 East Germans 
had fled to the Federal
68 Constantine C. Menges, The Future of Germany and the Atlantic Alliance (AEI Press: 
Washington, DC, 1991), p.85.
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Republic of Germany through Hungary and Czechoslovakia.
On October 7 ,1989  Mikhail Gorbachev visited East Germany for the 
fortieth anniversary of the communist regime. During his visit Gorbachev 
implied that the Soviets had adopted a position of non-interference in East 
Germany’s internal affairs. Gorbachev intimated that the Soviet soldiers 
stationed in East Germany would remain in their barracks as long as any public 
demonstrations were directed towards the policies of East Germany and not the 
Soviet Union. The subsequent street demonstrations, coupled with massive 
emigration to West Germany, forced the removal of Erich Honecker as the East 
German head of state.
Attempts by the communist regime to prop up the government failed 
miserably. The population's long-building dissatisfaction with the socialist 
model of government had come to a head. The government collapsed in a 
matter of months, in part due to the leadership’s reluctance to disband the 
much-reviled Stasi or secret police and in part due to a series of scandals 
involving corruption of former high-level government officials which contributed 
to deepening public mistrust.
Perhaps the final straw that broke the back of the East German regime 
was the leadership’s decision to open the Berlin Wall on November 9. At 
seven p.m. that day East German Politburo member Gunter Schabowski told a 
group of stunned reporters that East Germans could henceforth cross the border 
into West Germany.69 This statement led to utter confusion within East 
Germany. Civilians began massing at the Wall in central Berlin just minutes 
after the announcement. Not having received any official instructions, the East 
German border guards initially refused to open the border crossing. As
69 Elizabeth Pond, After the Wall: American Policy Toward Germany (“A Twentieth Century 
Fund Paper,” 1990), p.7.
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tensions mounted at the Wall, border officials made the fateful decision to open 
the border at around ten-thirty p.m.. Thousands of East Germans spilled through 
the border and at eleven o’clock the East German government issued the 
official order to open the Berlin Wall.
With the opening of the border, East Germans began to see firsthand the 
tremendous difference in living standards between the two Germanys. The 
political climate in East Germany quickly shifted from how to reform the East 
German government to how to unify with West Germany. Talk of unification 
abounded. The constant flow of East Germans westward forced the East 
German government to move elections scheduled for May to March 1990. The 
results of the first free elections in March underlined the overwhelming East 
German desire for unity. In May 1990, West and East Germany agreed to a 
treaty of economic, social and monetary union. It provided for East Germany to 
adopt West German currency and to remove all existing customs barriers 
between the two countries.
Economic union led to calls for rapid political union. This sentiment was 
strengthened by upheaval within the East German governing coalition and by 
the rapid economic downturn that occurred in East Germany following the 
economic union. The date for German reunification was set for October 3 ,1990  
with all-German elections to be held on December 2 ,1990. Between October 
third and December second, the administration of the former East Germany was 
assumed by officials from Bonn, and the members of the East German 
parliament sat as full members of the West German Bundestag.
The initial West German response to the 1989 events in East Germany 
was Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s Ten Point Plan for Reunification, which he 
announced to the Bundestag on November 28,1989. While the plan itself was 
a relatively modest proposal, it elicited quite an outcry from the other nations of
36
Europe. The plan called for the creation of a number of joint economic and 
environmental commissions and it pointed to the potential of a federation 
between the two states. According to the plan, federation would only have been 
possible once a democratically elected government was in place in East 
Germany.
Kohl saw the ten-point plan as an attempt to give the increasingly 
restless East Germans the prospect of an orderly process towards reunification 
while subtly putting the brakes on the situation. During his speech to the 
Bundestag Kohl had also sought to reassure the rest of the European nations 
as to the Federal Republic of Germany’s ongoing commitment to European 
integration. Unfortunately, Kohl’s actions were almost universally 
misinterpreted abroad as a purposeful acceleration rather than deceleration of 
events.70 Kohl’s mistake lay in the fact that he had not given any of his 
European neighbors any prior diplomatic briefing of his ten-point plan. 
Consequently, they were taken by surprise by the West German proclamation. 
Chancellor Kohl’s rationale for his unusual secrecy lay in the vagaries of 
German domestic politics. The Chancellor wished to seize the issue of 
reunification for his party in order to bolster its flagging political fortunes. 
Unfortunately, Kohl’s actions backfired somewhat in the international arena.
Having the most to lose, in terms of prestige and security, the Soviets’ 
response to the ten-point plan was the most negative. Official Soviet rhetoric 
immediately after the opening of the wall made it clear that reunification was not 
part of the Soviet agenda:
Bonn should take into account that any policies considering changes in 
borders would not be suitable to any government in Europe and would 
cause deep distrust. A new regime has started on the East German side
70 Pond, After the Wall, p.22.
of the border, but the border does remain.71
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Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev’s response to Kohl’s plan was to 
criticize it as an attempt by West Germany to gain “selfish benefits” from the 
process of change sweeping Eastern Europe. Gorbachev and Soviet Foreign 
Minister Eduard Shevardnaze warned that the subject of reunification was not 
an issue for current policy. Gorbachev stated his opinion of Germany’s actions 
flatly: “Let us not push or force the issue. History will decide this question.”72 
Soviet spokesman Gennadi Gerasimov crystallized the Soviet reaction to the 
ten-point plan by stating the following: “There is not one country in Europe today 
that would thirst for German Reunification because of the questions it raises for 
stability. It is not on the agenda.”73
British officials were not as blunt as the Soviets, but Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher made no secret of the British desire to see unification 
postponed for as long as possible. The Prime Minister envisioned a waiting 
period of some ten or fifteen years 74 The British government was particularly 
concerned about the new Germany’s membership in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization and felt that a slower pace for unification was more likely to ensure 
that Germany remained secured within the Western alliance. Both Britain and 
France seized the opportunity presented by the Soviets to remind the Germans 
that the victors of World War II still held residual four-power rights and that
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German reunification would not occur without their assent.75
The French response to unification was stronger than Britain’s as France 
had the most difficult time adjusting to the new realities presented by German 
unification. In addition to the psychological scars caused by its historical 
relationship with Germany, France was worried that the changes brought by a 
new, unified Germany would, “sweep away their Gaullist dreams of French 
rather than German leadership of Europe and their comfortable assumption that 
Paris could stay aloof from NATO’s military command indefinitely and still enjoy 
the alliance’s protection.”76 In the face of these prospects the French leaders 
were unsure of what to do. France attempted to slow down the pace of German 
unification by stabilizing the GDR government and, in a reversion to nineteenth 
century power politics, by reviving their ties with the Soviet Union.
The Bonn government found itself having to fend off criticism from 
Poland, the Soviet Union, and France because of Kohl’s failure to include an 
explicit guarantee of the Polish western boundary within the ten-point plan. The 
Polish western boundary, the so-called Oder-Neisse line, is drawn through what 
had been part of prewar Germany. Some members of the right wing of Kohl’s 
political party, the Christian Democrats, have long refused to close the border 
issue until after a formal World War II peace treaty.77 Kohl’s conspicuous 
silence on the border issue caused public worry throughout Europe about the 
aftermath of German reunification.
Of all the Federal Republic’s most important allies and neighbors, only 
the United States endorsed the prospect of German reunification from the start.
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The U.S. was most able to call for democratic unification because of its 
geographical isolation and lack of historical baggage concerning Germany.
As noted earlier, the pressure for German unification increased almost 
exponentially between November 1989 and May 1990. The Germans were 
fond of saying “the train of unification has left the station and there was no point 
in lying down in front of the locomotive.” Indeed, since unification had 
developed a momentum all its own, the question had become “when” and “how” 
and was no longer “if.” The dilemma facing the German government became: 
How were the Germans, in the face of widespread international uncertainty, 
going to make unification palatable for the Europeans?
The most important actor in Europe was obviously the Soviet Union. If 
Mikhail Gorbachev were to allow reunification, he would need to be able to sell 
the loss of East Germany to the hard-line conservatives within the Soviet 
Congress. In addition, the West, throughout the unification process, wanted to 
take the interests of the Soviet Union into account so Moscow would not feel 
insecure in post-unification Europe. Furthermore, the West wished to help 
Gorbachev as much as possible so that he could continue the domestic 
liberalizing reforms that were then in progress. Western diplomats referred to 
their willingness to work with the Soviet Union’s security and domestic concerns 
as “giving cover” to the Soviets on German unification.78
The West had a strong desire that united Germany be a member of the 
NATO alliance. However, German membership of NATO was a Soviet sticking 
point throughout the process of negotiation. Both sides wanted Germany “tied 
down” to a greater alliance, but the Soviets preferred that United Germany be 
either neutral or part of some sort of pan-European structure. The West felt that
78 Szabo, The Diplomacy of German Unification, p.54.
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NATO was the only structure capable of “handling” the new Germany and 
preventing a resurgence in German nationalism.
Genscher’s Foreign Policy
Throughout his tenure as Foreign Minister, Genscher always sought to 
place the goal of German reunification within the context of pan-European 
cooperation. During discussions of the future of the two Germanys, Genscher 
often stated that his official policy was equivalent to that which was stated in the 
“Letter on German Unity.” The letter, which was presented to the Soviets by the 
Federal Government of West Germany after the signing of the Treaty of Moscow 
in 1971, stated that the long-term goal of Germany is and always will be “to work 
for a state of peace in Europe in which the German nation will regain its unity 
through free self-determination.”79 Writing in 1982, Genscher restated the 
Federal Republic’s commitment to the principles of the “Letter on German Unity” 
while reaffirming West Germany’s commitment to pursuing that unity within a 
broader European context.
It should be obvious to all our allies that no responsible politician in the 
Federal Republic cherishes the illusion that it could seek to attain the 
indelible long-term goal of regaining German unity by pursuing a 
national policy of going it alone. Rather, the Alliance and a joint Alliance 
policy for a peace order encompassing the whole of Europe are the 
prerequisites for attaining this goal.80
During the events of 1989 in Eastern Europe, when German reunification 
first became a real possibility, Genscher maintained his stance that German 
unity would have to be embedded in a process of European integration. During 
an interview with Der Spiegel in September of 1989, Genscher was queried
79 Genscher, “Toward an Overall Western Strategy,” p.44.
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about the possibility of German unification taking place within the European 
development process. Genscher responded:
...our national interests are embedded in European interests. Any 
attempt to go it alone would lead us very quickly into dangerous isolation. 
It would create new instabilities in Europe, and we would thus neglect 
our responsibility to help maintain peace in Europe.81
Genscher also sought to reconcile the German commitment to further 
integration of the European Community with his commitment to greater pan- 
European cooperation through the CSCE. To Genscher, German membership 
in the EC served to promote both the German reunification process and the 
CSCE process. In an article published in Die Zeit in October, 1988, Genscher 
referred to the complementarity of the EC, CSCE and possible German 
reunification by stating, "Everything that brings Europeans closer together does 
the same thing for Germans - that is the whole of Europe."82 Genscher went on 
to elaborate upon the role of the EC in the context of greater pan-European 
cooperation:
The European Community is at present the most advanced form of 
coexistence of sovereign countries...This European Community is not the 
whole of Europe, but it is a central element of Europe's present and 
future structure. The dynamic development of the European community 
holds out great prospects for East-West relations.
As the pace of unification quickened Genscher repeated his call for 
unification embedded within a European framework. In a February 1990 
speech at a conference in Potsdam, Genscher presented his method of fitting
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the process of German unification to the requirements of the European 
community through the institutionalization of the CSCE process.
The two German states are called upon to provide not only a German, but 
also a European answer to the quest for national unity. The aim is to 
create a European framework in which the Germans can come together. 
The breathtaking pace of developments everywhere in Europe, but 
especially in the GDR, prompts many people to ask what is the 
foundation and framework for those developments. It is the Helsinki Final 
Act. The CSCE process must now come fully to bear. This requires that 
the signatories of the Final Act achieve a partnership for stability 
throughout Europe in political, economic and security terms. The basis 
for such a partnership for stability is also in the Helsinki Final Act and the 
CSCE process.
The CSCE process must become the Magna Carta of a stable European 
order, based on human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Helsinki 
Final Act gave the participating states a binding code of conduct for 
peaceful relations among them. It made the East-West conflict 
manageable and mitigated its consequences for the people. Today the 
CSCE is acquiring a new dimension: it must chart the course for 
overcoming the unnatural division of our continent. Following 
antagonism and then a modus vivendi, the third phase is now beginning, 
in which Europe will find its unity.83
In addition to his proclamations concerning the role of the CSCE in a 
new Europe, Genscher outlined ten new pan-European institutions and 
structures at the Potsdam conference which he considered necessary for 
cooperation and security reasons:
-A n  institution to co-ordinate East-West economic co-operation. The 
European Development Bank must also be seen in this context.
- A  pan-European institution for the protection of human rights. The 
application of the Council of Europe’s Human Rights Convention to the 
whole of Europe suggests itself.
- A  centre for the creation of a European legal area aimed at legal 
harmonization.
- A  European environmental agency.
-Extension of European Scientific Co-operation Project (EUREKA) co-
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operation to the whole of Europe.
-Collaboration between the European Space Agency (ESA) and 
corresponding Eastern institutions.
- A  centre to develop European telecommunications.
-A  centre to develop European transport infrastructure and policy.
- A  European verification centre.
-A  European conflict management centre.
To Keep the CSCE process moving, one might also set up a council of 
foreign ministers of the CSCE countries, which would meet at regular 
intervals....It is essential that by deepening and reinforcing the CSCE 
process, all participating states are prepared to create a framework of 
stability and network of security for foreseeable and unforeseeable 
developments in Europe.84
Genscher kept the concepts of the “Europeanization” of Germany and the 
institutionalization of the CSCE process at the forefront of his rhetoric during the 
process of reunification. Genscher had considerable success in realizing these 
aims.
Genscher’s Role
During the events of 1989 in Eastern Europe Genscher’s policies of 
rapprochement and cooperation towards the East began to pay dividends. On 
September 30,1989, East Germans who had been occupying the West German 
embassies in Prague and Warsaw were allowed to emigrate to West Germany. 
East Germany had previously refused to allow the emigration of some 3,500 
refugees who had been living on the embassy grounds for as long as eleven 
weeks. East Germany’s shift in position was attributed to a face-saving solution 
Genscher offered to the East Germans.
While attending the United Nations General Assembly meeting in late 
September, Genscher met with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnaze 
and East German Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer. In his meeting with Fischer,
84 Ibid., p.26-27.
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Genscher discussed his proposal to send the refugees out of the embassies via 
East Germany, thereby allowing the East Germans to expel their citizens 
formally and to claim that their laws against “fleeing the republic” were 
unbroken.85 In his meeting with Shevardnaze, Genscher pressed his concerns 
with his Soviet counterpart who agreed that “something must happen” and 
consented to exert his influence on Genscher’s behalf.86 Later that day, the 
East German government announced its decision to allow the departure of the 
refugees.
After the November 9 opening and subsequent dismantling of the Berlin 
Wall, Genscher flew to the U.S. on November 21 and presented President Bush 
with a piece of the Berlin wall. Genscher took the opportunity to discuss with 
Bush the U.S. position towards the upcoming Malta meetings with Soviet 
President Mikhail Gorbachev. After the meeting Genscher made three basic 
points which he indicated were shared by President Bush:
--It is in the western interest that the reform process in Eastern Europe 
succeed, without any interference from outside.
-T h e  Soviets should be assured solemnly and clearly that “we will not 
draw advantages out of problems or difficulties which may even turn into 
crises” during the course of the East European reform efforts.
-T h e  West accepts “the security interests of the Soviet Union” and 
shares an interest with the Soviet Union in maintaining stability as the 
reform process proceeds 87
Additionally, Genscher used the occasion of his meeting with Bush as an 
opportunity to declare his views on German unity. When asked about the
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demonstrations for reunification in East Germany Genscher responded by 
emphasizing four preconditions he felt were necessary to achieve unity:
-Germ an unity could only come about after free elections are conducted 
in East Germany;
-a n  actual union could only take place in a context in which Eastern and 
Western Europe also drew together;
- i f  Germany would be reunified it would only be on the basis of Western 
values, and;
-there was no question of altering the two Germany’s international 
boundaries established in 1945 at the close of World War II.88
Whereas Kohl had created international concern by presenting his ten- 
point plan, Genscher sought to calm the international community by offering 
some broad outlines for German unification. As noted above Kohl’s ten point 
plan caught the international community off-guard and elicited quite a few 
negative responses from Germany’s European neighbors. While Kohl made his 
pronouncement without Genscher’s knowledge, it was up to Genscher to 
handle the international fallout. On December fifth, 1989, Genscher flew to 
Moscow in an attempt to reassure the Soviets about the prospect of German 
reunification. Genscher assured Mikhail Gorbachev that Bonn considered the 
issue of German reunification as inseparably linked to the ending of the East- 
West division in Europe.89 In conversations with Eduard Shevardnaze, 
Genscher was asked whether German unification was more important to his 
government than European stability. Genscher replied that the Germans were 
well aware of their “special responsibility for stability in Europe.” Genscher 
added, ”Our national fate is incorporated into the fate of Europe. It means there 
is not going to be a single separate German course. Only the growing together
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of Europe can lead to a growing together of the two German states.”90
Genscher also took the opportunity to calm the fears of Poland that a 
unified Germany would be bent on expansion of its borders. While in Moscow 
Genscher insisted that Bonn recognized Germany’s eastern border with Poland. 
The next day, in a radio interview, Genscher declared that West Germany would 
never attempt to regain territory it lost Poland. He stated: “It is completely clear 
that the Germans do not question the Polish western border--now or in the 
future.”91 Genscher’s proclamations served to defuse but not to resolve the 
issue. The Polish border question continued to be an irritant during ensuing 
negotiations over German reunification. When Kohl’s stubbornness threatened 
to cast a cloud over negotiations, Genscher broke publicly with his coalition 
partner over the Chancellor’s refusal to explicitly guarantee Poland's postwar 
boundary. In March of 1990 Genscher accused Kohl of domestic posturing over 
the border issue and urged him to agree to an immediate joint East and West 
German guarantee of the border.92 Kohl had maintained that a united Germany 
would not seek to change Poland's borders, but that only the parliament of a 
united Germany could guarantee those borders. This distinction was enough to 
cause considerable nervousness for Poland. Genscher stated that Kohl’s 
recalcitrance was endangering unification by spreading doubts about, “the 
sincerity of German intentions to convince others that...we don’t want a German 
Europe, but rather a European Germany.”93 The issue was eventually resolved 
in July of 1990 when East and West Germany promised to guarantee the
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postwar German-Polish border.
The Polish agreement was worked out during a one day meeting of the 
“two plus four” group. The “two plus four” talks became the forum for 
hammering out the external aspects of German unification. Originating with the 
Americans and agreed to at an East-West conference of Foreign Ministers in 
Ottawa on February 13, the formula stood for the four occupying powers after 
World War II and the two Germanys. At Genscher's insistence, “Two” preceded 
“four” in the formula to stress that the Germans were on equal footing with the 
four powers and were not being dictated to during the talks.
The purpose of these rotating conferences of Foreign Ministers was to 
manage the concerns of all the parties involved in unification. It was decided 
beforehand that the only business of the talks would be the restoration of full 
sovereignty to Germany and the termination of the four powers' “rights and 
responsibilities” in Germany which were left over from the Potsdam Conference 
held at the close of World War'll.94 Genscher accepted the approach of using 
only the smaller forum of “two plus four” instead of the thirty-five member CSCE 
to manage reunification because it avoided a large peace conference leading 
to a World War II peace treaty. In that scenario, Germany could have been 
subject to claims for war reparations and other complications which would have 
hindered the unification process.95 The final results of the talks would be 
reported to the thirty-five nation summit meeting of the CSCE planned for late 
1990.
With the preclusion of a large role for the CSCE in the negotiation of 
German unification, Genscher strove to prevent the "two plus four" talks from
94 Pond, After the Wall, p.47.
95 Szabo, The Diplomacy of German Unification, p.60.
48
usurping any more of the CSCE’s bailiwick. In early April, 1990, despite the 
need to ease Soviet military concerns over unification, Genscher stated that the 
"two plus four" talks were not the proper forum to determine the future strength 
of the German army or of NATO forces on German territory.96 In the statement 
Genscher acknowledged that the Soviets had legitimate security concerns and 
that those concerns would have to be answered. However, Genscher argued, 
discussing troop deployments in the "two plus four" talks would upset the 
Vienna negotiations on reducing conventional military forces in Europe.
During the negotiations on the creation of the "two plus four" talks, 
Genscher had been the most vocal proponent of a 35 nation CSCE summit. 
Genscher had argued that the CSCE should meet in 1990 to give “the dramatic 
developments in East and Central Europe a stable framework.”97 Genscher 
used the opportunity provided by his support for the Vienna negotiations to 
promote the CSCE as “the framework for creating new institutions to 
accommodate the political changes sweeping Europe.” He stated that this 
framework might include regular meetings of the foreign ministers of the CSCE 
countries, expanding the Council of Europe’s Court of Human Rights to include 
all CSCE signatories, and creating new organizations for the protection of 
minority rights and for crisis management of political disputes in Europe.98
As noted above, the Soviet domestic situation required “giving cover” to 
Moscow. The “two plus four” talks were threatened by the Soviet insistence that 
united Germany not be a member of NATO. The first Western official to strike a 
workable balance between “giving cover” to the Soviets and NATO membership
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was Genscher. The idea that Genscher proposed was soon adopted as 
NATO’s official position and became universally known as the “Genscher Plan.” 
Genscher believed Gorbachev needed to avoid the appearance of 
having lost the Cold War. Concurrently, Genscher believed that unification had 
to occur within the framework of European integration without compromising 
NATO and the Americans. To that end Genscher sought to alter NATO’s 
function so that it would be less threatening to the Soviets. On May 31,1990  
Genscher declared that full NATO membership for a reunified Germany was not 
a cause for worry for the USSR because the Alliance would “appear in a new 
light” in which it would no longer confront the Warsaw Pact, but rather cooperate 
on issues of security." In effect, Genscher urged Gorbachev to be patient while 
the U.S. and Europe brought NATO into line with a dramatically restructured 
Europe. With the metamorphosis of the NATO alliance, Genscher argued, 
German membership would be much less of a strategic setback for the Soviets.
The Genscher Plan was an attempt to balance the Soviets' domestic and 
international concerns with the interests of Germany and the Western alliance. 
Specifically, the plan stipulated that NATO would agree not to advance its 
troops or nuclear weapons onto the territory of the German Democratic 
Republic. For a period of several years the FRG also would not station its forces 
assigned to NATO to that area. Further, the USSR, which was having difficulty
housing soldiers returning from Eastern Europe, would be able to keep its
■/
troops stationed in the GDR for a transitional period of three to four years.100 
Additionally, as noted above, Genscher’s compromise included a “kinder, 
gentler” NATO that would change from being a military adversary to a vehicle
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for cooperative security.101 Genscher strongly repeated his commitment to 
developing German unity within a European framework. He stated that unity 
would be a declaration that guaranteed, not threatened, the borders of all of 
Germany’s neighbors. Genscher clearly gave priority to the European 
Community and the CSCE as the framework for a new European security 
order.102
On July 6 Genscher’s counsel of patience to the Soviets on the issue of 
NATO membership came to fruition. A NATO summit held in London declared 
that the USSR was no longer an adversary and invited Gorbachev to address 
the meeting. The London Declaration, the final document of that summit, 
spelled out the new definition of NATO’s role as a guarantor of peace and 
stability in Europe. The declaration reflected the new, more political role that 
Genscher had outlined in the Genscher Plan. The principles for the new 
“kinder, gentler” NATO outlined in the London Declaration included the 
following elements:
-transform the East-West relationship from one of confrontation to one of 
cooperation;
-transform the character of NATO’s conventional defense both through 
CFE (conventional forces in Europe) reduction and through a new 
strategy of “reduced forward presence” to replace that of forward 
defense; this would include reorganizing NATO troops into multinational 
corps, limiting their offensive capability and setting limits on the number 
of German forces;
-modify NATO nuclear strategy away from flexible response to a view of 
nuclear weapons as a last resort; offer to negotiate on SNF (short range 
nuclear forces) and to eliminate all nuclear artillery shells from Europe if 
the Soviets do the same;
-support the strengthening and institutionalization of the CSCE.103
101 Szabo, The Diplomacy of German Unification, p.57.
102 Ibid., p.57.
103 Ibid., p.92.
51
With the pledge to transform NATO, one of the last stumbling blocks to 
Soviet acquiescence was removed. Kohl had agreed to a limit on the size of 
the unified Germany's armed forces at the London Declaration. Prior to the 
NATO summit Gorbachev had scored a decisive victory over his hard-line 
conservative opponents at the Party Congress in early July. Additionally, in 
mid-June Gorbachev had demonstrated new flexibility on the issue of German 
troops remaining in NATO. German assurances of economic assistance and 
the promise of a general treaty of German-Soviet economic cooperation all 
served to foster a general environment of cooperation between the two states. 
This state of affairs proved amenable to Gorbachev who extended an invitation 
on July 11 to meet with Kohl at his private dacha in the Caucasus mountains. It 
was during this meeting that Gorbachev negotiated with Kohl the broad outlines 
of German membership in NATO. Additionally, they negotiated the departure of 
the 360,000 Soviet troops in the GDR. The Soviet troops were to gradually 
withdraw over a period of a few years. Gorbachev had accepted the Genscher 
Plan.
Genscher's commitment to the CSCE process helped pave the way for 
Soviet acquiescence in the conditions of German unification. For years he had 
sought to dispel any potential fear of German unification present among West 
Germany’s European neighbors. When queried in 1989 about the prospects for 
reunification Genscher responded by stating that if unification were ever to 
occur, “any German attempt to go it alone would create a dangerous 
situation.”104 Furthermore, Genscher played an extremely important role in 
generating an image of a “European Germany instead of a German Europe.” 
Genscher argued again and again that a gain for Germany was a gain for
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Europe as a whole because of Germany’s commitment to European integration 
and the CSCE process.
It is only in this historic dimension that German unification will become 
possible - without German neutralization: with united Germany as a 
member of the European Community and of the changing Western 
alliance, and through our active part in building a European system of 
peace in the context of the CSCE.105
Throughout the diplomacy of unification process, Genscher reiterated his 
belief that the Helsinki Final Act had given participant states a code of conduct 
for their peaceful coexistence. Germany wished only to reinforce the principles 
of the Final Act by strengthening the CSCE process. Through this approach 
Genscher sought to create a European framework in which to embed German 
unification and thereby assure Bonn’s European neighbors of their security 
interests. To this end Genscher forcefully lobbied the United States and the 
other members of NATO to offer to the Soviets a pan-European security council 
that would assure them a voice in European affairs even after their troops had 
left Eastern Europe.106
The U.S. initially adopted a wary approach to Genscher’s entreaties for 
the strengthening of the CSCE. The U.S. had often interpreted Genscher’s 
enthusiasm for CSCE as an attempt to replace the NATO alliance with some 
vague notion of collective security. In addition, the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 
had originally been a topic of heated ideological debate in the United States. 
However, by 1990 the U.S. administration had come to recognize the 
accomplishments of the CSCE process on the issues of borders and human 
rights, although the administration was still skeptical about its potential in the
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realm of European security. Elizabeth Pond demonstrates the change in the 
U.S. government’s attitude toward the CSCE by detailing the role the CSCE 
process played in the liberalization of Eastern Europe:
The minimal statement on human rights inserted into the Helsinki 
agreement at the insistence of the West Europeans stimulated 
astonishing ferment inside the closed East European regimes. A series 
of ad hoc review conferences kept the spotlight on repression of 
dissidents, and governments that acknowledged the legitimacy of foreign 
state’s interest in their human rights performance kept releasing political 
prisoners on order to avoid international criticism. This, in turn, 
emboldened more citizens to discover and speak their minds.
The fateful Hungarian decisions to dismantle the barbed wire on the 
Austrian border in May and not to force East German emigrants to return 
to the GDR in August could be traced to the moral suasion of CSCE.
More broadly, Western assurances at Helsinki that the East-West borders 
were “inviolable” (though not “unchangeable if peaceful means were 
used) had allowed Solidarity to spring up and demand domestic change 
in Poland without fearing exploitation of any resulting Polish crisis by 
German “revanchists.” Helsinki - and the rise of the unorthodox Mikhail 
Gorbachev to lead the Soviet Union - paved the way for the peaceful 
revolutions of 1989 throughout Eastern Europe.
In retrospect, the Americans acknowledged the political virtues of 
CSCE.107
Genscher took pains to voice his support for the continuing leading role 
for NATO in Europe’s security system. Speaking before the German Bundestag 
concerning the role of the CSCE in German reunification, he reaffirmed 
Germany’s commitment to NATO. “We are aware that this larger, whole [post­
unification] Europe can only preserve its stability through the continuing 
membership of the Unites States and Canada in the Western Alliance and 
through their participation in the CSCE process.”108
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Once the Americans were assured that Genscher intended CSCE to 
supplement and not supplant NATO they agreed to the strengthening and 
institutionalization of CSCE. At Moscow’s request a CSCE summit was 
scheduled at the end of 1990 following the completion of the two plus four talks. 
The CSCE conferences were given a regular schedule and a permanent 
secretariat was established. Institutionalizing the CSCE process in this manner 
helped both to fulfill Genscher’s hopes for CSCE and allowed Gorbachev to sell 
the loss of the GDR and Eastern Europe to his domestic skeptics.
On September 12, the last "two plus four" meeting was held in Moscow to 
tie up the diplomatic loose ends. On October 3 unified Germany became a 
sovereign state. On November 19, the CSCE summit in Paris met to give its 
blessing to the peaceful reunification of Germany and, more broadly, Europe.
A few days prior to the Paris CSCE Summit Genscher was queried about 
the role CSCE played in the unification process. The questioner pointed out 
that ironically, Helsinki had originally been seen by the Soviets as a way to 
cement the division of Europe and Germany. Responding to this assertion 
Genscher quipped “if there hadn’t been a CSCE, we would have had to invent it 
now.” On a more serious note Genscher stated that “the task was to create a 
basis for change in Europe. Our expectations have been fulfilled, we are now 
living in a fundamentally changed Europe.”109
109 Tom Heneghan, “Instead of Sealing German Split, CSCE Helped to Overcome It,” Report 
by Reuters correspondent, Bonn, November 15,1990. RFE/RL B-Wire, F F064.
C O N C L U S IO N
Judged by his actions, Hans-Dietrich Genscher was in many respects 
purely a pragmatist. Genscher’s support for the stationing of INF missiles on 
German soil and his fervent pursuit of German reunification are both examples 
of a statesman acting according to the primacy of his state's interest. However, 
despite Genscher's preoccupation with.these pragmatic and state-centric 
concerns, he did evolve a set of basic foreign policy precepts that went beyond 
purely German interests. Genscher repeatedly and consistently voiced his 
support for multilateral solutions to international problems. In various coalitions 
and international bodies he asserted the superiority of cooperative actions that 
sought to increase the number of participants in diplomatic negotiations and 
cooperative security arrangements in Europe. Genscher's favorite vehicle for 
the promotion of multilateralism was the CSCE.
During the early years of the INF debate, Genscher was a strong 
proponent of the stationing of missiles on German soil. Despite the damage 
such a move would inflict upon East-West relations, Genscher accepted the 
necessity of fostering a credible nuclear deterrent in the face of an expansionist 
Soviet Union:
A realistic detente policy is one that is very clear as to its limits. Detente 
demands security as its foundation, and there can be no security for us 
without the [NATO] Alliance and its, and therefore also our, defensive 
readiness. Anyone that thinks that he can safeguard his security through 
his own efforts and detente alone, would be a dangerous dreamer.110
110Hans-Dietrich Genscher, MRealistischer Entspannungs Politik," in Deutche Aussen-Politik 
(Stuttgart: Bonn Aktuell, 1981), p.46.
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Throughout the often tense German-Soviet relationship that 
characterized the period of the INF debate, Genscher always kept the lines of 
communication open through the CSCE. Although forced to sacrifice detente 
for defense policy, Genscher did not forsake the CSCE process. He used the 
CSCE process to fill the gap in East-West relations created by the deployment 
of INF missiles in West Germany. Additionally, the CSCE process produced the 
CDE agreement on confidence and security building measures that lessened 
the chances for military mishaps between East and West. Genscher used the 
CSCE to sustain East-West relations despite the often acrimonious negotiations 
that accompanied the early years of the INF debate.
Although Genscher adopted a defensive stance during the Brezhnev era, 
he quickly altered his position on West German deployment of INF when Mikhail 
Gorbachev rose to power in the Soviet Union. As noted above, Genscher was 
the first Western official to advocate "taking Gorbachev at his word." Beyond a 
purely rhetorical call for cooperation with the Soviet Premier, Genscher backed 
up his assertions by publicly breaking with his conservative coalition partner, 
the CDU-CSU, on the issue of the merits of Gorbachev’s proposal to abolish 
both medium and short range missiles in Europe. For this stance, Genscher 
received much criticism both at home and abroad. When Gorbachev 
announced that the Soviet Union would unilaterally reduce troops in Eastern 
Europe, Genscher's faith in Gorbachev was rewarded. It is this stance that 
provides insight into Genscher's motivation. By calling for the West to trust 
Gorbachev, Genscher was making a clear bid to manage the upcoming phase 
of East-West relations. Genscher took a significant risk by supporting the Soviet 
leader. The only gains he stood to receive in 1987 were improvements in 
Europe's security situation and improvements in East-West relations; both of 
these gains were the primary foci of the CSCE process.
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German reunification presents the most telling example of state-interest. 
Obviously, reunification was of primary benefit to the West German state. 
However, Genscher made it palatable for other Europeans by placing it within 
the context of pan-European unification. Genscher's insistence that Germany 
remain rooted in the EC and NATO, and his insistence that the CSCE play a 
role in German and European unification, lent credence to his stated desire for 
a "European Germany, not a German Europe." Genscher declared in May,
1990,
Rather than creating new problems for Europe, German Unification will 
play a part in ensuring a new and lasting stability. We consider the 
transformation of this insight of European history into a policy for 
Germany and for a gradually uniting Europe to be Germany's European 
mission as we approach the end of the century.111
This statement was not simply rhetoric. German reunification was potentially a 
diplomatic nightmare for both East and West. The Soviets, as noted above, 
worried about their security interests in post-unification Europe. Likewise, the 
West's concerns centered on the destabilizing effect a large, economically 
powerful, independent Germany would have upon Europe. Genscher was able 
to satisfy both of these conflicting concerns. As noted above, Genscher saw the 
broadening and deepening of the EC as a necessary step toward greater pan- 
European cooperation. Genscher held up the EC as the most advanced form of 
coexistence of sovereign countries anywhere in the world. For him, the EC was 
to become the model for relations of all of Europe and Germany was to be the 
driving force at its center. Additionally, Genscher addressed the West's security 
concerns by flatly stating that a reunited Germany would remain a member of 
NATO. For the Soviets, the transformation of the CSCE into a durable and
111 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "Opening Remarks at the 'two-plus-four' conference in Bonn, May 5, 
1990," in Statements and Speeches, Volume 13, No.11, May 8, 1990, p.2.
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effective, pan-European, collective security organization would provide the 
Soviets a permanent voice in European affairs. Together, Genscher saw the 
deepening and broadening of the EC and the institutionalization of the CSCE 
process as the intermediate steps towards the creation of a common democratic 
area throughout all of Europe. Genscher was able to satisfy the security 
interests of both the East and West and bring Europe closer to his vision of unity 
by embedding German unification within the CSCE process and the European 
Community.
The evidence presented by these case studies points to a depiction of 
Genscher as a statesman who was committed to preserving his state's interests 
while maintaining a basic set of beliefs that European relations could best be 
served in multilateral frameworks. During the course of his tenure in office, 
Genscher transformed Germany’s relationship with Eastern Europe from one of 
detente and defense to an active policy of pan-European entente. Genscher 
was able to pursue pan-European unity without compromising German interests 
and his role as Foreign Minister of Germany. The CSCE process provided 
Genscher with the perfect vehicle to accomplish both of these potentially 
conflicting goals.
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